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SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER:  
ON THE DISSOLUTION OF PREDICTABILITY IN THE 
ELLERTH/FARAGHER MATRIX CREATED BY SUDERS  
FOR CASES INVOLVING EMPLOYEE PERCEPTION 
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“Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Sexual harassment law works to protect employees from wrongful behav-
ior.2  When that protection fails, or, at a minimum, becomes conflicted when 
employee perception3 motivates the dispute, the efficacy of the law becomes 
questionable.  The questionable character of sexual harassment law in employee 
perception cases comes on the heels of several Supreme Court decisions begin-
ning in 1998 when it decided Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth4 and Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton,5 and continuing to the summer of 2004, when it decided Penn-
sylvania State Police v. Suders.6 
The Ellerth and Faragher decisions set forth an entirely new matrix for       
determining sexual harassment liability.  In the first section of the matrix, a court 
determines whether a supervisor’s or manager’s behavior led to an employee 
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 1. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 61 (Norman Kemp Smith trans., Random 
House 1958) (1781). 
 2. AUGUSTUS B. COCHRAN III, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE LAW: THE MESHELLE VINSON CASE 
2 (2004) (describing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)). 
 3. The term “employee perception,” for the purposes of this analysis, refers to how the em-
ployee measures the level of harassment occurring in the workplace as opposed to how the em-
ployer or even a reasonable person would measure that harassment.  See Richard C. Sorenson et al., 
Solving the Chronic Problem of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: An Empirical Study of Factors Affect-
ing Employee Perceptions and Consequences of Sexual Harassment, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 457 (1997). 
 4. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 5. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 6. 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004), rev’g Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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suffering a tangible adverse employment action.7  If the court finds in the       
employee’s favor, the employer suffers strict liability.8 
In the second section of the matrix, if there is no tangible adverse employ-
ment action, the court must determine whether the employer is eligible for an 
affirmative defense.9  The employer can avoid liability entirely if (1) the           
employer promulgated an effective sexual harassment policy/complaint system 
and (2) the allegedly harassed employee failed to take advantage of the system 
in place.10  The imposition of strict liability punishes employers who do not con-
trol how their supervisors and managers treat employees.11  The affirmative     
defense releases employers who control the workplace by preventing and cor-
recting improper employee treatment.12  The combination of how the Court    
imposes strict liability and yet offers an affirmative defense relies entirely on the 
employer’s behavior.  Simply put, if the employer behaves “badly” by imposing 
a tangible adverse employment action, there is strict liability.13  If the employer 
behaves “well,” that is, by preventing and correcting wrongful behavior, there is 
no liability at all.14 
The matrix offers predictability, simplicity, and, as a result, an incentive for 
employers to behave “well.”15  The court can often determine as a matter of law 
whether the employee suffered a tangible action and/or whether the employer 
sufficiently prevented and corrected improper behavior.16  Such court determi-
nations fulfill the predictability and practicability components of the matrix.  In 
certain situations, however, courts must analyze employer behavior through the 
eyes of the employee.17  Two areas in particular within the Ellerth/Faragher      
matrix do not focus on employer behavior but must rely on employee percep-
tion.18 
When using the first section of the matrix, imposing strict liability is prob-
lematic when the aggrieved employee experiences constructive discharge.19  The 
employer has constructively discharged the employee when an employer delib-
erately makes an employee’s working conditions so intolerable that the em-
ployee must quit.20  The doctrine of constructive discharge originated in cases 
 
 7. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753-54; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808. 
 8. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808. 
 9. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 10. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 11. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802-03. 
 12. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08. 
 13. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808. 
 14. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808. 
 15. Karen M. Buesing & Gerarad D. Solis, Sexual Harassment: Effective Policies and Procedures Af-
ter Faragher, 3 (2001), at http://www.bnabooks.com/ababna/eeo/2001/buess.doc. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
      17      See infra Part III. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Constructive discharge refers to the termination of employment where “the abusive work-
ing environment became so intolerable that [the employee’s] resignation qualified as a fitting re-
sponse.”  Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2347 (2004). 
 20. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490, 495 (4th Cir. 1972) (holding that the employer con-
structively discharged the employee because of his union activities).  The National Labor Relations 
Board has established the two elements of constructive discharge as (1) the burdens imposed upon 
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under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) which expressly forbids unfair 
labor practices.21 
The Suders decision relates to the first part of the matrix, because the Court 
addressed whether constructive discharge can constitute a tangible adverse   
employment action.22  This recent decision both assists in the analysis of con-
structive discharge cases in the context of employee perception and, ironically, 
confuses the issue further.  The assistance comes in the holding which states that 
constructive discharge can be a tangible adverse employment action.23  The con-
fusion comes in the requirement that an “official act” precipitate the constructive 
discharge and that the harassment be “worse case,” which the Court defined as 
“harassment ratcheted up to the breaking point.”24 
Employee perception cases are not limited to constructive discharge, how-
ever.  When using the second section of the matrix that provides the affirmative 
defense, employee perception continues to operate in conflict.  When the        
employee fails to come forward in the belief that he or she will suffer retaliation, 
the matrix is unclear as to whether liability exists.25  In both fear of retaliation 
and constructive discharges cases, employer behavior does not drive analysis 
based upon the matrix.26  The matrix accordingly weakens or even fails because 
it no longer provides a clear resolution. 
This article investigates how the Ellerth/Faragher matrix, which offers clear 
standards for employer liability, results in an evaluative gap when the basis of a 
claim involves the aggrieved employee’s perceptions.  In exploring this gap, in 
Part II, we give context to the history of sexual harassment law culminating in 
the Ellerth and Faragher matrix.  In Part III, we examine how the precedent that 
relies on an analysis of employer behavior under the Ellerth/Faragher matrix may 
negatively impact the clear resolution of employee perception-based claims, 
namely constructive discharge claims (as with the Suders case), and fear of       
retaliation claims.  We finish in Part IV by exploring the strengths and weak-
 
the employee must cause, and the employer must intend to cause, a change in working conditions so 
difficult or unpleasant as to force the employee to resign; and (2) those burdens were imposed be-
cause of the employee’s union activities.  Crystal Princeton Ref. Co. v. Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 
222 N.L.R.B. 1068, 1069 (1976).  Currently, two circuit courts require that the employee show intoler-
able conditions and the employer’s specific intent to coerce the employee’s resignation.  Hukkanen 
v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs., 3 F.3d 281, 284 (8th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 
F.2d 936, 944 (4th Cir. 1992). The other circuits apply the “reasonable employee” test, requiring the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable employee 
would be compelled to resign.  James v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F.3d 989, 992 (10th Cir. 1994); Stet-
son v. NYNEX Serv. Co., 995 F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir. 1993); Ugalde v. W.A. McKenzie Asphalt Co., 990 
F.2d 239, 242 (5th Cir. 1993); Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 677 (7th Cir. 
1993); Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 755-56 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1221 (1994); Aviles-
Martinez v. Monroig, 963 F.2d 2, 6 (1st Cir. 1992); Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1079 
(3d Cir. 1992); Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360, 361 (9th Cir. 1987); Hopkins v. Price 
Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1987), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 21. See 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1988). 
 22. Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2347. 
 23. Id. at 2351. 
 24. Id. at 2349, 2355 (holding that “worse case” harassment is that harassment which “is so in-
tolerable as to cause a resignation”). 
 25. See infra Part III.B. 
 26. See infra Part IV. 
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nesses of the avenues of analysis available to courts, concluding that the weak-
nesses override the strengths, and demonstrating how fundamentally problem-
atic the matrix is in cases involving employee perception. 
II.  THE ELLERTH/FARAGHER MATRIX IN CONTEXT 
In Title VII, Congress addressed the specific issue of workplace discrimina-
tion.27  In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,28 the Supreme Court held that Title VII forbids 
both practices adopted with a discriminatory motive and also neutral practices 
that have a discriminatory effect on minorities and women.29 
Congress augmented the Griggs decision when it passed the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 (the Act).30  The Act provided compensatory and punitive damages 
for disparate treatment lawsuits brought by private plaintiffs.31  Responding to 
Congress’s emphasis on employer liability, courts interpreting Title VII have 
proceeded to motivate employers to curb wrongful behavior.32  Courts quickly 
recognized that “quid pro quo” sexual harassment—demanding sex as a condi-
tion for receiving job benefits—violated Title VII.33  However, recognition of 
quid pro quo causes of action represented only a small step in the law’s evolu-
tion. 
In Meritor Savings Bank FSP v. Vinson,34 the Supreme Court specified a new 
analysis when it used agency principles to develop a vicarious liability standard 
 
 27. See EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL 
HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS, EEOC Notice 915.002 (June 18, 1999), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html (stating that while Title VII and related legis-
lation purports to remedy discrimination, “their primary purpose is to prevent violations”) [herein-
after ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE]; see generally MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 85-86 (5th ed., Aspen Law & Business 2000) (defining and explaining 
Title VII). 
 28. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 29. Id. at 432. 
 30. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq.). 
 31. See id.  Among the stated motivations driving the Act’s passage was “the need to overturn 
Price Waterhouse [v. Hopkins],” which Congress believed had severely undercut Title VII’s effective-
ness.  See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 45 (1991).  In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court held that an 
employer who made an employment decision based on discrimination could escape liability if it 
could prove that it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination.  See Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).  This holding undermined Title VII’s intent to com-
pletely eliminate intentional discrimination. 
 32. See, e.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 
U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).  In recognizing sexual harass-
ment as Title VII discrimination, the Court has relied, among other principles, on the power theory 
represented in the writing of Catherine MacKinnon and others.  See, e.g., CATHERINE MACKINNON, 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 57-99 (1979).  Such theories asserted that women are 
treated differently as a group because they lack equal power to men, and sexual harassment per-
petuates the power imbalance.  MacKinnon therefore defined sexual harassment as “the unwanted 
disposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power.”  Id.; see also 
Joanna P. L. Mangum, Note, Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.: The Fourth Circuit’s “Simple 
Logic” of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 76 N.C. L. REV. 306, 320 (1997). 
 33. See Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 333, 333-36 (1990). 
 34. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
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for harassment.35  In addition, the Court held that Title VII encompasses “hostile 
work environment” harassment.36  Because of the Court’s incorporation of vi-
carious liability in Meritor, lower courts developed differing standards for em-
ployer liability based on differing interpretations of agency principles.37  Inevita-
bly, even courts using similar analyses reached conflicting conclusions.38 
In Ellerth and Faragher, both decided on the same day, the Supreme Court 
attempted to resolve some of the post-Meritor disparity over the standard for 
employer liability.39  The Court stated that the terms “quid pro quo” and “hostile 
environment” were not controlling for purposes of determining employer liabil-
ity.40  The Court reasoned that the determinative objective question was whether 
a “tangible employment action” took place.41  In cases in which there was no 
 
 35. See id. at 70-72.  The Court relied upon the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (1957), 
which states: 
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the 
scope of their employment.  (2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his ser-
vants acting outside the scope of their employment, unless: (a) the master intended the 
conduct or the consequences, or (b) the master was negligent or reckless, or (c) the conduct 
violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or (d) the servant purported to act or to speak 
on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided 
in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957). 
 36. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.  Hostile work environment harassment occurs when harassing 
conduct “unreasonably interfere[s] with an individual’s work performance or creat[es] an intimidat-
ing, hostile, or offensive working environment.”  Paul, supra note 33, at 334 (quoting EEOC Guide-
lines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1990)).  The Court in Meritor held that 
to establish a hostile working environment claim, harassment must be severe and pervasive.  See 
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. 
 37. See, e.g., Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2001); Gentry v. Ex-
port Packaging Co., 238 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2001); Star v. West, 237 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2001); O’Rourke 
v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 2001); White v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Corrections, 
221 F.3d 254 (1st Cir. 2000); Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2000); 
Montero v. Agco Corp., 192 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 1999); Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 
F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999); Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 1999); Shaw v. Autozone, Inc., 180 F.3d 
806 (7th Cir. 1999); Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 1999); Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 
166 F.3d 139 (3rd Cir. 1999); Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Indest v. Freeman Deco-
rating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999); Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 156 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 38. See Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 671 (2000). 
 39. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752-53; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780. 
 40. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754.  The Supreme Court stated that “cases based on threats which are 
carried out are referred to often as quid pro quo cases, as distinct from bothersome attentions or sex-
ual remarks that are sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment.” Id. at 751.  
The Court also noted that the terms “quid pro quo” and “hostile work environment” do not appear 
in Title VII.  Id. at 752.  The Court noted that when used in Meritor, the terms served a specific and 
limited purpose — “to instruct that Title VII is violated by either explicit or constructive alterations 
in the terms or conditions of employment and to explain the latter must be severe or pervasive.” Id. 
 41. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753-54; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. In Ellerth  the Court stated: 
To the extent. . . [that the terms] illustrate the distinction between cases involving a threat 
which is carried out and offensive conduct in general, the terms are relevant . . . .When a 
plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted from a refusal to submit to a 
supervisor’s sexual demands, he or she establishes that the employment decision itself 
constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of employment that is actionable under 
Title VII.  For any sexual harassment preceding the employment decision to be actionable, 
however, the conduct must be severe or pervasive. 
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tangible employment action, the employer could raise an affirmative defense.42  
However, the defense was unavailable if a tangible employment action oc-
curred.43 
In Ellerth, the Supreme Court granted review and certified the question of 
whether an employer is vicariously liable when a supervisor for the company 
threatens an employee with adverse employment action but does not fulfill 
those threats.44  The Supreme Court’s decision first dispelled contradictory lower 
court interpretations of Meritor.45  As used in Meritor, quid pro quo and hostile 
work environment established the initial question of whether a plaintiff could 
prove discrimination in violation of Title VII.46  The terms “quid pro quo” and 
“hostile work environment” are useful, the Court noted, only to distinguish be-
tween situations in which “threats are carried out and those where they are not 
or are absent altogether, but beyond this they are of limited utility.”47  “Quid pro 
quo” and “hostile work environment” do not appear in the text of Title VII and, 
according to the Court, should not form a standard by which to judge employer 
liability.48 
The Court in Meritor, in fact, did not use the terms “quid pro quo” and 
“hostile work environment” to establish a liability standard.49  However, lower 
courts following Meritor began to use the terms to establish a standard by which 
to hold employers vicariously liable.50  The Court in Ellerth held that plaintiffs 
may introduce evidence of quid pro quo or hostile environment, but such evi-
dence may not serve as the actual basis for a claim.51  Instead, plaintiffs must 
now prove “that a tangible employment action resulted from a refusal to submit 
to a supervisor’s sexual demands [in order to establish] that the employment  
decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of employ-
ment.”52 
 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753-54. 
 42. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; see infra notes 34-51 and accompanying text. 
 43. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 44. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 746-47. 
 45. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. 743 (1998). 
 46. Id. at 753. 
 47. Id. at 751. 
 48. Id. at 752. 
 49. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 50. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752-53. (citing Davis v. Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365, 1367 (8th Cir. 1997); 
Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 513-14 (9th Cir. 1994); Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106-
07 (3rd Cir. 1994); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir. 1993); Kauffman v. Allied 
Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 185-86 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1041 (1992); Steele v. Offshore 
Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 51. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751, 753-54 (1998). 
 52. Id. at 753-54.  Beyond such a limited use of the terms, the Court found that the general 
common law of agency will guide findings of vicarious liability.  See id. at 754-55 (noting that even 
though it made significant amendments to Title VII after Meritor, Congress did not alter that case’s 
holding that agency principles should guide employer liability).  See id. at 764.  The Court examined 
§ 219 of the Restatement, detailed in note 35 supra.  See id. at 758.  The Court noted that the negli-
gence standard under section 219(2)(b) of the Restatement—wherein an employer is liable even if it 
knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it—”sets a minimum standard for 
employer liability under Title VII.”  Id. at 758-59.  Because plaintiff Ellerth argued that employers 
should be vicariously liable for supervisors’ acts, the Court examined section 219(2)(d).  Id.  Section 
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The Court noted that “[e]very Federal Court of Appeals to have considered 
the question has found vicarious [employer] liability when a discriminatory act 
results in a tangible employment action.”53  Because a supervisor acts with the 
authority of the company and “tangible employment actions fall within the spe-
cial province of the supervisor” subject to possible review by higher level super-
visors, employer liability attaches when a tangible employment action is taken 
by a supervisor against a subordinate.54  Courts therefore analyze the existence 
of a tangible employment action by referring to employer behavior.55 
In the absence of tangible employment action, however, application of the 
strict liability standard does not occur.56  When no tangible employment action 
takes place, the employer may utilize a two-pronged affirmative defense to pre-
clude both liability and damages.57  In recognition of Title VII’s goal of encourag-
ing anti-harassment policies and grievance mechanisms, the affirmative defense 
consists of the following two elements: “(a) that the employer exercised reason-
able care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and 
(b) that the plaintiff employee reasonably failed to take advantage of any pre-
ventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm 
otherwise.”58 
 
219(2)(d) imposes “vicarious liability for intentional torts committed by an employee when the em-
ployee uses apparent authority (the apparent authority standard) or when the employee ‘was aided 
in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.’”  Id. at 759 (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957)).  Reasoning that the apparent authority standard is relevant 
“where the agent purports to exercise a power which he or she does not have, as distinct from where 
the agent threatens to misuse actual power,” the Court found apparent authority analysis inappro-
priate unless “it is alleged there is a false impression that the actor was a supervisor, when he in fact 
was not.”  Id. at 759.  Therefore, the Court found that the “aided in the agency standard” was the 
proper analysis when a party seeks to impose vicarious liability based on an agent’s misuse of dele-
gated authority.  See id. at 760.  The Court further considered the issue of vicarious liability using the 
“aided in the agency standard” and found that the standard requires the “existence of something 
more than the employment relation itself.”  Id. at 760.  Without more, an employer would be subject 
to vicarious liability not only for all supervisor harassment, but also for all co-worker harassment.  
See id.  Such a finding would be contrary not only to the general rule that sexual harassment by a su-
pervisor is not automatically within the scope of employment and attributable to an employer but to 
the holding in Meritor and to the precedent that establishes a negligence standard for co-worker har-
assment.  See id. (citing McKenzie v. Ill. Dept. of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing 
sex discrimination); Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 872 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. de-
nied, 522 U.S. 1110 (1998) (discussing sex discrimination); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 
1273 (7th Cir. 1991) (discussing race discrimination); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1997) (stating that the 
“knows or should have known” standard of liability applies for cases of harassment between “fellow 
employees”).  See also Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., 81 F.3d 48, 50 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 
863 (1996). 
 53. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760. 
 54. Id. at 762. 
 55. See id. at 762-63 (stating that agency principles apply when a supervisor brings the com-
pany’s resources against the employee). 
 56. See id. at 763 (stating that only a supervisor may take steps that result in a tangible employ-
ment action). 
 57. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
 58. Id. at 764-65. 
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In Faragher, the Court adopted the same holding as in Ellerth.59  The Court 
held that “an employer is vicariously liable for actionable discrimination caused 
by a supervisor, but subject to an affirmative defense” which looks at the rea-
sonable care exercised to prevent any sexually harassing behavior as well as the 
employee’s failure to adequately take advantage of preventative or corrective 
opportunities.60  The Court in Faragher reiterated Meritor’s requirement that gen-
eral agency principles determine employer liability.61  Meritor’s holding that an 
employer is not automatically liable for harassment by a supervisor remained 
intact.  Faragher, nonetheless, recognized the tension between the new vicarious 
liability rule and Meritor.62  The Faragher Court offered two alternatives to allevi-
ate the tension, “one being to require proof of some affirmative invocation of 
that authority by the harassing supervisor, the other being to recognize an       
affirmative defense to liability in some circumstances, even when a supervisor 
has created the actionable environment.”63  These alternatives are the basis of the 
matrix. 
The first phase in the matrix is to determine whether an employer is subject 
to strict, vicarious liability for a supervisor’s sexual harassment when an         
employer takes a tangible employment action.64  When there is no tangible     
employment action, an employer may use the second phase of the matrix and 
raise the two-pronged affirmative defense against liability to damages.65  The 
first prong addresses “whether the employer exercised reasonable care to pre-
vent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior.”66  The second 
prong requires that the “plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advan-
tage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer 
or to avoid harm otherwise.”67  While it appears that the prongs are balanced in 
that the first focuses on employers and the second on employees, the only sig-
nificant circuit split arises in the second.68 
III.  ANALYZING EMPLOYEE PERCEPTION CLAIMS  
UNDER A MATRIX DRIVEN BY EMPLOYER BEHAVIOR 
Many of the disputes resolved within the matrix analyze employer behav-
ior—did the employer impose a tangible adverse employment action, prevent 
the harassment, or correct the harassment?  With strict liability in phase one of 
the matrix and an affirmative defense in phase two, analyzing employer behav-
 
 59. Faragher, 24 U.S. at 780. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 800.  The Court in Faragher concluded that courts should consider harassment by su-
pervisors outside the scope of employment because otherwise such harassment would also be within 
the scope of co-employees employment, rendering vicarious liability rather than negligence the 
standard for co-employee harassment.  Id. 
 62. Id. at 794-95. 
 63. Id. at 804. 
 64. Id. at 808. 
 65. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See infra Part III.C. 
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ior in sexual harassment claims allows for resolution exactly as the Court         
intended—predictably with punishment for wrongful behavior and a defense 
for good behavior.69  Not all cases decided under Ellerth and Faragher, however, 
fit within an analysis of employer behavior.  In two notable exceptions, the court 
must determine liability from the perspective of the aggrieved employee.  First, 
in phase one of the matrix, a court will occasionally address an employee’s claim 
of constructive discharge when determining whether a tangible adverse em-
ployment action took place.70  Second, in phase two of the matrix where courts 
apply the affirmative defense, some employees will allege a fear of retaliation.71  
Both types of employee perception claims, constructive discharge and fear of   
retaliation, do not fit cleanly within the Ellerth/Faragher matrix and its goal of 
having consistent, fair, and predictable determinations of employer sexual har-
assment liability.  To determine how to run employee perception claims through 
the matrix, we must first analyze how the courts are struggling with construc-
tive discharge in phase one and fear of retaliation in phase two. 
A. Phase One of the Matrix: Is Constructive Discharge a Tangible Employment 
Action? 
A tangible employment action, according to the Court in Ellerth, is “a sig-
nificant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, 
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a 
significant change in benefits.”72  In most cases, applying this definition to the 
facts has been noncontroversial.  For example, in Forshee v. Waterloo Industries, 
Inc.73 the court held that the termination of the plaintiff the day after she refused 
a supervisor’s sexual advance was clearly a tangible adverse employment        
action, as Ellerth defined the term to include “firing.”74  Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) Guidance offers further assistance by providing 
the following examples: hiring and firing, promotion and failure to promote, 
 
 69. See Marcia Coyle, Sex Harassment Redefined in Several Rulings, High Court Ends Confusion Over 
Employer Liability, NAT’L  L.J., July 6, 1998, at A1. 
 70. See, e.g., Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2347 (2004) (defining constructive dis-
charge as the termination of employment where “the abusive working environment became so intol-
erable that [the employee’s] resignation qualified as a fitting response”). 
 71. See, e.g., Iduyusi v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 30 Fed. Appx. 398 (6th Cir. 2002); Harri-
son v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014 (10th Cir. 2001); Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 
F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 72. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761; see ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 27, at § IV.B.  The EEOC 
Guidance defines tangible employment action as “a significant change in employment status” and 
provides the following characteristics of a tangible employment action: 
A tangible employment action is the means by which the supervisor brings the official 
power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates, as demonstrated by the following: it re-
quires an official act of the enterprise; it usually is documented in official company re-
cords; it may be subject to review by higher level supervisors; and it often requires the 
formal approval of the enterprise and use of its internal processes.  2.  A tangible employ-
ment action usually inflicts direct economic harm.  3.  A tangible employment action, in 
most instances, can only be caused by a supervisor or other person acting with the author-
ity of the company. 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 27, at § IV.B. 
 73. 178 F.3d 527 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 74. Id. at 530. 
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demotion, undesirable reassignment, a decision causing a significant change in 
benefits, compensation decisions, and work assignment.75 
The matrix dictates that tangible adverse employment cases resolve pre-
dictably by applying strict liability if the employer behavior is “bad enough.”  
Issues concerning constructive discharge, however, test the matrix because     
employer behavior becomes secondary to an analysis of the aggrieved             
employee’s perception of that behavior. 
Courts have traditionally treated constructive discharge as an actual dis-
charge—which is a tangible employment action.76  The Court in Ellerth explicitly 
stated that constructive discharge is a tangible employment action, but courts 
that have addressed this issue are split.77  We will analyze the split both to reveal 
on which issues the courts disagree and how that disagreement impacts the   
matrix. 
1. Circuit Split 
a) Courts that Hold Constructive Discharge Is Not a Tangible Em-
ployment Action 
The Second Circuit in Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad78 and the 
Sixth Circuit in Turner v. Downbrands, Inc.79 allowed an employer to assert the af-
firmative defense despite finding that the employer constructively discharged its 
employee.80  The Second Circuit noted that the Supreme Court in Ellerth focused 
on the following language of the Restatement (Second) of Agency in determin-
ing when an employer is strictly liable for the discriminatory acts of its supervi-
 
 75. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 27, at § IV.B; see also Watson v. Norton, 10 Fed. Appx. 
669, 678 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that when there is no change in salary, rank, or grade, there is no 
tangible adverse employment action); Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 153-54 (3d Cir. 
1999) (holding that when specific negotiated conditions of the plaintiffs’ move to Durham were dis-
rupted, a tangible adverse employment action occurred). 
 76. Jackson v. Ark. Dep’t of Educ., 272 F.3d 1020, 1026-27 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that construc-
tive discharge constitutes a tangible employment action); Cherry v. Menard, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 
1160, 1171-74 (N.D. Iowa 2000). 
 77. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760-61 (stating that “[a] tangible employment action constitutes a signifi-
cant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with sig-
nificantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits”); see infra 
Part III.A.3, Table 1. 
 78. 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 79. 221 F.3d 1336, No. 99-3984, 2000 WL 924599 (6th Cir. June 26, 2000). 
 80. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 283; see also EEOC v. Barton Protective Servs., Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 57, 60 
(D.D.C. 1999) (stating even if a claim of constructive discharge was substantiated such a finding 
would not preclude the use of the affirmative defense on behalf of the employer); Schoiber v. Emro 
Mktg. Co., No. 95-C-5726, 1999 WL 825275, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (holding that employer did not con-
structively discharge plaintiff and reserving analysis of constructive discharge as a tangible em-
ployment action); Desmarteau v. City of Wichita, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1079 (D. Kan. 1999) (finding 
that tangible actions of the supervisor would logically exclude actions which are only constructively 
attributed to him and therefore the affirmative defense is still available); Alberter v. McDonald’s 
Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1147 (D. Nev. 1999) (holding that even though the employee resigned and 
was constructively discharged, such a discharge was not a tangible employment action); Powell v. 
Morris, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1019 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (holding that even though an employee suffered a 
constructive discharge, such a discharge was not meant to be a tangible employment action and the 
employer is not barred from asserting the affirmative defense). 
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sory employees: ‘“[a] master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants 
acting outside the scope of their employment, unless: . . . (d) the servant . . . was 
aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.”‘81  The 
requirement of a tangible employment action by a harassing supervisor only 
imposes employer liability without the possibility of an affirmative defense.  
Therefore, where the employer is implicated in the harm visited upon the em-
ployee by his or her supervisor: 
The supervisor has been empowered by the company as a distinct class of agent 
to make economic decisions affecting other employees under his or her con-
trol . . . .  A tangible employment decision requires an official act of the enter-
prise, a company act . . . . For these reasons, a tangible employment action taken 
by the supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the employer . . . .  
Co-workers, as well as supervisors, can cause the constructive discharge of an 
employee.  And, unlike demotion, discharge, or similar economic sanctions, an 
employee’s constructive discharge is not ratified or approved by the employer.82 
Not only did the court in Caridad rely on Ellerth’s interpretation of the Restate-
ment, it also relied on the Supreme Court’s definition of tangible employment 
action.83  The Supreme Court defined tangible employment action as “a signifi-
cant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,    
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a 
significant change in benefits.”84  The Supreme Court omitted constructive dis-
charge from its list of behaviors that constitute tangible employment actions.85  
This omission is noteworthy, particularly since the plaintiff in Ellerth herself 
claimed constructive discharge.86  The Sixth Circuit agreed.87 
Several district courts have followed Caridad by refusing to find strict liabil-
ity for constructive discharge, holding that it is “not a ‘tangible employment   
action,’ as the Supreme Court used that term in Ellerth and Faragher, because it is 
not an action made with the authority or approval of the employer.”88  Other dis-
 
 81. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 294. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. at 294-95; see also Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive 
Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 329 (2004). 
 84. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. 
 85. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 294-95. 
 86. Id. at 295; see also Desmarteau v. City of Witchita, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1079 (D. Kan. 1999). 
 87. Turner, 2000 WL 924599, at *1; see also Keaton v. State of Ohio, No. C2-00-1248, 2002 WL 
1580567, at *9 (S.D. Ohio June 3, 2002).  The Turner court stated that constructive discharge did not 
constitute a tangible employment action, citing Caridad for that proposition.  The Sixth Circuit 
aligned itself with the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Caridad, stating that a “claim of constructive dis-
charge is not a tangible employment action for purposes of Faragher and Ellerth.”  Turner, 2000 WL 
924599, at *1. 
 88. Scott v. Ameritex Yarn, 72 F. Supp. 2d 527, 595 (D.S.C. 1999) (citing Caridad, 191 F.3d at 294); 
see also EEOC v. Barton Protective Servs., Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 1999) (noting that plaintiff’s 
claim of constructive discharge would not amount to a tangible employment action even if proven); 
Desmarteau v. City of Wichita, Kansas, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1079 (following the holding in Caridad 
and explaining  that “the focus [in Ellerth] on the tangible actions of the supervisor would logically 
exclude actions which are only ‘constructively’ attributed to him, and would exclude employment 
consequences arising from a plaintiff’s particular reaction to a hostile working environment”); Al-
berter v. McDonald’s Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1146 (D. Nev. 1999) (reasoning that “[c]onstructive 
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trict courts have agreed that constructive discharge is not a tangible employ-
ment action, but they have done so on grounds that differ from those articulated 
in Caridad.  In Powell v. Morris,89 the court held that a constructive discharge is 
not a tangible employment action,90 reasoning that if the Supreme Court had   
intended to include constructive discharge, the Court “could have easily listed 
[it] along with the other incidents as constituting a tangible employment          
action.”91 
b) Courts that Hold Constructive Discharge is a Tangible Employ-
ment Action 
In direct opposition to the Second and Sixth circuits, the Third Circuit in 
Suders v. Easton92 held that constructive discharge was a tangible employment 
action within the meaning of Ellerth and Faragher.93  The plaintiff claimed she had 
no choice but to resign from her position as a communications operator with the 
Pennsylvania State Police.94  She alleged that she could not continue her em-
ployment because several male supervisors engaged in sexually hostile behavior 
on the job.95  Suders complained to the state police equal employment opportu-
nity officer, but the officer refused to provide the proper forms for filing a com-
plaint.96  Eventually, the work environment deteriorated to such an extent that 
Suders claimed several defendants invented theft charges against her.97    After 
being detained as a suspect, Suders resigned.98  Suders then sued the Pennsyl-
vania State Police and several individuals for discrimination and sexual harass-
ment.99  A federal district court dismissed her suit; she appealed to the Third 
Circuit.100 
In attempting to run Suders’ claim through the matrix, the Third Circuit 
began by synthesizing pre-existing analyses of constructive discharge.  The 
court in Suders made three observations: 
(1) although we have not definitively ruled on the issue, our recent decisions 
have suggested that a constructive discharge constitutes a tangible employment 
action; (2) none of the grounds advanced by [cases that find to the contrary] per-
suade us that a constructive discharge should not be held to constitute a tangible 
employment action; and (3) holding an employer strictly liable for a constructive 
discharge resulting from an actionable harassment of its supervisors more faith-
 
discharge does not meet the definition of ‘tangible employment action’ as described in [Ellerth], [be-
cause] constructive discharge . . . is not an action taken by an employee’s supervisor”). 
 89. 37 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (S.D. Ohio 1999). 
 90. Id. at 1019. 
 91. Id. 
 92. 325 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2003) rev’d sub nom. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004). 
 93. See id. at 435. 
 94. Id.. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 439. 
 99. Id. at 435. 
 100. Id. at 439. 
082205 GABEL.DOC 11/11/2005  9:18 AM 
 SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER 93 
fully adheres to the policy objectives set forth in Ellerth and Faragher and to our 
own Title VII jurisprudence.101 
As for its first observation, the court relied on previous cases.102  For exam-
ple, the court in Durham Life Insurance Co. v. Evans 103 found that the plaintiff    
resigned due to humiliating and sexist remarks, the removal of her office, and 
the disappearance of her files.104  The Durham Life Insurance court ruled that the 
resignation was a constructive discharge which constituted a tangible employ-
ment action, thereby barring the employer’s use of the affirmative defense.105  
The court in Suders also noted the case of Cardenas v. Massey,106 in which the 
plaintiff claimed that a racially hostile work environment resulted in his con-
structive discharge.107  The Third Circuit reversed summary judgment for the 
employer, noting that “[i]f Cardenas convinces a jury that he was victimized by 
a hostile work environment created by [the defendants], it is certainly possible 
that the same jury would find that the hostile environment was severe enough 
to have precipitated Cardenas’ resignation, i.e., a constructive discharge.”108    Al-
though the circuit court left the ultimate question of liability for the district 
court, it assumed that a constructive discharge was a tangible adverse employ-
ment action.109 
The court’s second observation in Suders was that the holdings were unper-
suasive in cases where constructive discharge was not found to constitute a tan-
gible employment action.110  The court examined Caridad’s proposition that the 
Supreme Court’s omission of constructive discharge was an intentional exclu-
 
 101. Id. at 454. 
 102. See id. at 455 (explaining its holdings in Durham Life Insurance Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139 
(3d Cir. 1999) and Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 103. 166 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 104. Id. at 144. 
 105. Id. at 155; see also Kohler v. Inter-Tel Techs., 244 F. 3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2001); White v. N.H. 
Dep’t of Corr., 221 F.3d 254, 261-62 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that employer constructively discharged 
plaintiff by removing her from her unit, thereby disallowing the employer’s use of the affirmative 
defense); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427, 429 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that to establish con-
structive discharge, plaintiff must prove that her working conditions were so difficult or unpleasant 
that a reasonable person in her shoes would have felt compelled to resign); Jones v. USA Petroleum 
Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1385 (S.D. Ga. 1998) (incorporating the Ellerth affirmative defense as part 
of a more stringent constructive discharge analysis); Lintz v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc. 50 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 
1083 (D. Kan. 1999) (holding that if an employee’s work conditions were intolerable and she had no 
other choice but to quit, then the employee can claim she was constructively discharged.  In Kohler, 
the Ninth Circuit declined to decide the issue of whether a constructive discharge constitutes a tan-
gible employment action.  Kohler, 244 F.3d at 1168.  The plaintiff alleged that her supervisor sexually 
harassed her during the entire period of her four months employment by making unwelcome sexual 
remarks, advances, and physical contact.  Id. at 1168.  The plaintiff soon quit as a result of the sexual 
harassment and claimed that her constructive discharge was a tangible employment action.  Id. at 
1169.  The court, leaving the issue open, found a lack of causation and therefore did not address 
whether a constructive discharge was tantamount to a tangible employment action.  Id. at 1176. 
 106. See 269 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 107. Id. at 266-67. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d at 454. 
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sion from the list of representative tangible employment actions.111  The court 
noted that “the Supreme Court made it clear that it intended to provide a non-
exclusive list of clear cases of tangible employment actions, on one hand, and 
broader categories, on the other.”112  Several aspects of the definition in Ellerth 
support the conclusion that the Supreme Court intended the definition to be 
non-exhaustive.113  As other courts have noted, the use of the qualifier “such as” 
indicates that tangible employment actions are not limited to those that follow 
the qualifier.114  “By employing this structural technique, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized a simple reality of harassment in the modern workplace: tangible      
employment actions often take the form of subtle discrimination not easily cate-
gorized as a formal discharge or demotion.”115  Finally, the court stated that by 
holding so, they “effectively encourage employers to be watchful of sexual har-
assment in their workplaces and to remedy complaints at the earliest possible 
moment; otherwise, they risk losing the benefit of the affirmative defense should 
victimized employees feel compelled to resign.”116 
The Eighth Circuit has also held that a constructive discharge constitutes a 
tangible employment action.  In Jaros v. Lodgenet Entertainment Group,117 the court 
held that a constructive discharge does in fact constitute a tangible employment 
action.118  Several district courts have followed the reasoning employed by the 
Second and Eighth circuits.119 
 
 111. Id. at 455. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 93 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 115. See Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d at 456. 
 116. Id. at 458. 
 117. 294 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2002) (relying on Jackson v. Ark. Dep’t of Educ., 272 F.3d 1020 (2002)). 
 118. Id. at 966. 
 119. Cherry v. Menard, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1170-1173 (N.D. Iowa 2000).  The court in 
Cherry stated that the test of whether a constructive discharge is a tangible employment action is not 
dependent on who caused the discharge; rather, the question is whether constructive discharge 
caused by a supervisor “constitutes a significant change in employment status.”  Id. at 1170.  The 
court also pointed out that a constructive discharge “that results from the sexually harassing conduct 
of a supervisor is no less the act of the employer than a firing, failure to promote, demotion, or reas-
signment.”  Id. at 1173.  Lintz v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (D. Kan. 1999) (noting that 
the parties agreed that constructive discharge constitutes tangible employment action); Galloway v. 
Matagorda County, 35 F. Supp. 2d 952, 957 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (stating that “constructive discharge 
qualifies as a tangible employment action”); Jones v. USA Petroleum Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1383 
(S.D. Ga. 1998) (holding the same as Lintz).  See also Vasquez v. Atrium Door & Window Co. of Ariz., 
Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (S.D. Ariz. 2002) (“First, the Supreme Court’s list of tangible employment 
actions in Ellerth was likely not intended to be either exhaustive or exclusive of a constructive dis-
charge.  Therefore, the exclusion of constructive discharge from the list of examples does not exclude 
the possibility that constructive discharge may be a tangible employment action.  Second, the Court’s 
holding herein is consistent with the remedial purposes of Title VII.  Precluding an interpretation 
that constructive discharge was not a tangible employment action would be contrary to this purpose. 
Such a holding would not protect an employee from the unlawful behavior of a supervisor who cre-
ates ‘intolerable and discriminatory working condition[s]’ and would likely insulate the employer 
from liability if the victimized employee were forced to quit.  Third, as the Supreme Court noted, ‘a 
tangible employment action in most cases inflicts direct economic harm.’ No doubt, so does a con-
structive discharge.  The economic injury and impact to the employee is the same, i.e., loss of em-
ployment, regardless of whether he or she is unlawfully terminated from employment or construc-
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2. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders: The Supreme Court Resolves the 
Circuit Split 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari from the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision in Suders v. Easton, and heard arguments on March 31, 2004.120  On 
June 14, 2004, the Court issued its opinion regarding the question of “whether a 
constructive discharge brought about by supervisor harassment ranks as a tan-
gible employment action and therefore precludes assertion of the affirmative de-
fense articulated in Ellerth and Faragher.”121 
The Court resolved the split affirmatively by finding that constructive dis-
charge can be a tangible adverse employment action as long as the harassment 
presents a “worse case” scenario, “harassment ratcheted up to the breaking 
point.”122  This holding ostensibly resolves the question of whether constructive 
discharge can satisfy the first prong of the matrix.  While this holding appears to 
bring clarity to constructive discharge cases, in fact, the Court arguably creates 
confusion that did not previously exist by adding wide room for interpretation 
in the requirement that the plaintiff prove he or she reached a breaking point.  
To find that harassment is “worse case” or that a plaintiff has reached a breaking 
point is likely to be an issue of fact.  Accordingly, by introducing an issue of fact 
into the determination, a constructive discharge is, at best, “maybe” a tangible 
adverse employment action.123  If the court cannot impose strict liability as a mat-
ter of law, then, in constructive discharge cases, the matrix stalls while the court 
makes factual determinations—a delay that does not exist in most other tangible 
adverse employment action cases.124 
The Court also imposed an extra element by holding that even if the plain-
tiff experienced a constructive discharge, employers could use the affirmative 
defense when that constructive discharge is not accompanied by an official act.125  
“[W]hen an official act does not underlie the constructive discharge, the Ellerth 
and Faragher analysis, we here hold, calls for extension of the affirmative defense 
to the employer.”126  Accordingly, some constructive discharge cases, for exam-
ple, constructive discharge cases without an official act, will still allow the em-
ployer to avoid strict liability. 
 
tively discharged.  A constructive discharge is usually more drawn out over time and, thereby, sub-
jects the employee to more painful abuse than a direct unlawful termination and yet, in an unfair 
irony, a contrary holding would leave the employee with no legal remedy for enduring the discrimi-
natory working condition in the optimistic hope that it would stop.” (citations omitted)). 
 120. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2342 (2004), rev’g Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432 (3d 
Cir. 2003). 
 121. Id. at 2350. 
 122. Id at 2355.  See also Shari M. Goldsmith, The Supreme Court’s Suders Problem: Wrong Question, 
Wrong Facts Determining Whether Constructive Discharge is a Tangible Employment Action, 6 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 817, 827 (2004) (explaining the level of severity necessary in general to make construc-
tive discharge actionable). 
 123. See Art Gutman, The Supreme Court’s Ruling in Suders—They Missed the Boat, THE INDUS.-
ORG. PSYCHOL., at 92-99, available at http://www.siop.org/tip/backissues/Oct04/PDF/ 
422_092to099.pdf (Oct. 2004). 
 124. See Nancy R. Mansfield and Joan T.A. Gabel, An Analysis of the Burlington and Faragher Af-
firmative Defense: When are Employers Liable?, 19 LAB. LAW. 107, 115 (2003). 
 125. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S.Ct. at 2355. 
 126. Id. 
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The court put forth several reasons for insisting upon an official act.  First, 
the employer exercises greater control over official acts, and absent an official 
act, “the employer ordinarily would have no particular reason to suspect that a 
resignation is not the typical kind daily occurring in the work force.”127  Second, 
an official act accompanying a constructive discharge provides more certainty 
that “the supervisor’s misconduct has been aided by the agency relation.”128   Re-
calling the reasons behind the affirmative defense, the Court reasoned that 
“when a supervisor’s harassment of a subordinate does not culminate in a tan-
gible employment action . . . it is ‘less obvious’ that the agency relation is the 
driving force.”129  The uncertain agency relation present in a constructive dis-
charge without an official act “justifies affording the employer the chance to    
establish, through the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, that it should not be 
held vicariously liable.”130 
The Court then provided two examples of when application of the new 
standard is appropriate for utilizing the affirmative defense in constructive dis-
charge cases.  Reed v. MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc., a First Circuit case, involved 
a constructive discharge claim.131  The First Circuit held that the affirmative de-
fense was available to the employer because there was no official act involved in 
the supervisor’s behavior.132  The Court contrasted Reed with Robinson v. Sapping-
ton, a Seventh Circuit decision which held that an official act underlay a con-
structive discharge.133  In Robinson, the plaintiff complained of sexual harassment 
by a judge for whom she worked which caused the judge to transfer her to work 
for a second judge.134  The plaintiff heard that working for the second judge 
would probably be “hell,” and that it was in her “best interest to resign.”135  Ac-
cording to the Seventh Circuit, the first judge’s decision to transfer the plaintiff 
provided the “official act” accompanying the constructive discharge, thereby 
prohibiting the employer from asserting the affirmative defense.136 
The Supreme Court ultimately remanded the Suders case to determine the 
circumstances surrounding the plaintiff’s decision to leave her employment.137  
Subsequent interpretation of the Supreme Court’s holding in Suders has an      
interesting potential.  Before this decision, constructive discharge cases relied on 
an analysis of the employee’s perception of the severity of the harassment.  That 
factor remains to some degree as the Court requires a showing of “worse case” 
severity.138  By requiring an official act, the Court essentially brings the analysis 
back to employer behavior, a standard that previous history indicates will run 
more smoothly through phase one of the matrix.  On the other hand, the matrix 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 2353. 
 130. Id. at 2355. 
 131. Reed v. MBNA Marketing Sys., 333 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 132. Id. at 33. 
 133. Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 134. Id. at 323-24. 
 135. Id. at 324. 
 136. Id. at 337. 
 137. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2357. 
 138. Id. at 2955. 
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could stall, much in the same way that the original Circuit split caused it to 
break down, if the courts are inconsistent when weighing the official act against 
the “worse case” harassment. 
B. Phase Two of the Matrix: Should an Employee’s Fear of Retaliation Eliminate 
the Affirmative Defense? 
Phase Two of the Ellerth/Faragher matrix offers employers an affirmative   
defense and the opportunity to completely avoid liability as long as there is no 
tangible employment action.139  The affirmative defense has two prongs: first, the 
employer must exercise reasonable care to prevent and to promptly correct any 
sexually harassing behavior; second, the employer must show the employee did 
not reasonably take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities the 
employer provided or that the employee failed to avoid harm otherwise.140  The 
Supreme Court maintained in Ellerth that the affirmative defense and its   liabil-
ity “escape hatch” was appropriate because harassment is unlikely to occur if 
employers and employees fulfill their respective obligations.141 
For an employer to successfully navigate phase two of the matrix, it must 
have had an effective complaint procedure which, according to the Court,       
encouraged employees to report harassment early enough for an employer to 
intervene before liability arose.142  Courts have generally found that the           
employer will prevail if either (1) a reasonable person in the employee’s position 
would have come forward earlier143 in order to prevent the harassment from    
becoming more severe or (2) the employee entirely failed to report the harass-
ment.144 
 
 139. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753-54; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808. 
 140. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.  The court in Ellerth found that the affirmative defense has its limits.  
Courts have generally declined to extend the affirmative defense to other circumstances or claims.  
See Laroche v. Denny’s, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1384 n.14 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (declining to extend the 
affirmative defense to public accommodation cases); Lintz v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 
1081 (D. Kan. 1999) (declining to extend the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to a claim attempting 
to hold an employer liable under a negligence theory). 
 141. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
 142. Id.  But see ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 27, at § V.B (stating that liability can arise 
despite the exercise of reasonable care by both employer and employee because of the vicarious li-
ability standard). 
 143. Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that waiting two years was an 
unreasonable time to wait to report harassment as the employer had a well-known policy prohibit-
ing sexual harassment). 
 144. Idusuyi v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 30 Fed. Appx. 398, 403-04 (6th Cir. 2002); Leo-
pold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 2001); Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 863-64 
(9th Cir. 1999); Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 397 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that a reasonable person 
would not place herself in the situation to be harassed if she could have avoided it and by doing so 
the employee unreasonably failed to avoid the harm); Shaw v. Autozone, Inc. 180 F.3d 806, 813 (7th 
Cir. 1999); Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 511 (5th Cir. 1999); Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., 
Inc., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1322-24 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (noting that waiting three months after the first 
harassment to file a grievance is unreasonable and claiming that fear of retaliation does not cure the 
fact that the employee failed to take advantage of the employers grievance policy); Hardy v. Univ. of 
Ill., No. 00C7639, 2002 WL 909184, at *8-*10 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that an employee acted unrea-
sonably when she waited to report her grievance until the harassment ended, provided incomplete 
details about the harassment, and failed to give complete details of the harassment until two months 
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C. If the Employee Did Not Report Harassment, Was the Failure to Report Rea-
sonable? 
When an employee does not report harassing behavior, the employee fails 
to take advantage of the employer’s preventive measures.  The court generally 
considers this failure to report unreasonable, even if the employee had a subjec-
tive reason for not reporting the harassment.145  For example, in Leopold v. Bacca-
rat, Inc.,146 the Second Circuit found that when an employee failed to take advan-
tage of the employer’s internal complaint procedures, the employer should 
prevail on the second prong of the affirmative defense.147  In that case, the court 
rejected the employee’s contentions that the employer would not take her com-
plaint seriously and that she feared retaliation because the extensive record did 
not substantiate her fears.148  The court held that her unsubstantiated concerns 
were unreasonable justifications for failing to avail herself of the company’s 
grievance policy.149  While most courts have found that a general fear of retalia-
tion is not a sufficient justification for failure to report harassment, not all courts 
agree.150 
1. Courts that Hold Failure to Report Due to Fear of Retaliation Is Unrea-
sonable 
Many courts have held that an employee’s fear of retaliation by the         
employer does not make a failure to report harassment reasonable.151  While the 
facts of these opinions differ, the holdings are relatively consistent in that fear, 
alone, is insufficient to alleviate the obligation to come forward.  These findings 
 
after filing the grievance).  See also ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 27, at § V.D. (“An employee 
who failed to complain does not carry a burden of proving the reasonableness of that decision.  
Rather, the burden lies with the employer to prove that the employee’s failure to complain was un-
reasonable.”) 
 145. Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood Co., 297 F.3d 405, 414 (5th Cir. 2002); Idusuyi v. Tenn. Dep’t of 
Children’s Servs., 30 Fed. Appx. 398, 403-04 (6th Cir. 2002); Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 
243 (2d Cir. 2001); Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 863 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 146. 239 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 147. Id. at 245. 
 148. Id. at 246. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See infra Part III.B. 
 151. Iduyusi, 30 Fed. Appx. at 403-4 (holding “it [was] unreasonable for employees to pass their 
own judgments—absent any supporting facts—about how effectively an employer’s sexual harass-
ment polices operate”); Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood Co., Inc., 297 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2002); Barrett v. Ap-
plied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that a general fear of retalia-
tion does not excuse a failure to report sexual harassment); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 
1014 (10th Cir. 2001) (following Barrett in holding that a general fear of retaliation will not excuse a 
failure to report); Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 2001); Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192 
F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 1999); Mangrum v. Republic Indus., Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Ga. 2003); 
Murray v. City of Winston Salem, 203 F. Supp. 2d 493, 501 (M.D.N.C. 2002); Sconce v. Tandy Corp., 9 
F. Supp. 2d 773 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (finding that a threat of retaliation is not enough to satisfy a failure 
to report without corroborating evidence); Willingham v. QMS, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20423 
(S.D. Ala. 1999). 
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come despite empirical evidence that there is a chasm between courts’ expecta-
tions for employees and what they are actually willing to do.152 
2. Courts that Hold Failure to Report Due to Fear of Retaliation Is Reason-
able 
Several district court cases hold that an employee’s failure to report har-
assment or take advantage of the remedial system is reasonable if the employee 
fears retaliation.  For example, in Maple v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd.,153 the court found 
that the question of whether the employee’s failure to report was unreasonable 
was an issue for the trier of fact.154  The court found that because other employ-
ees had little success with reporting problems to human resources and her boss 
threatened to fire her when she rejected him, a jury may find that her failure to 
report was reasonable.155  Similarly, in Dise v. Henderson,156 the employee reported 
a previous problem, but was told that she had no recourse because she was a 
temporary employee.157  The employer also reduced her hours.158  The court 
found that because of this prior inaction upon receiving her complaint, a jury 
may find that a failure to report a subsequent situation was not unreasonable.159 
While these cases contrast to those courts’ decisions that have found a fear of re-
taliation does not justify a failure to come forward, they do still require some 
minimal corroboration of the fear the employees felt. 
IV.  THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE  
AVENUES OF ANALYSIS AVAILABLE TO COURTS 
“[A] common aspect of sexual harassment is that the harasser is in a posi-
tion of power over the victim of the harassment and that unwanted sexual       
advances toward the victim constitute an exercise of that power.”160  The expres-
sion of power is closely tied to how the employee fears and acts upon that 
power, both by leaving the employment and by fearing retaliation.  Retaliation 
is a manifestation of the underlying basis for sexual harassment—power—and 
the employee’s rejection of that power.161  When that power is rejected, retalia-
tion is a likely response.162 
 
 152. Chamallas, supra note 83, at 374 (citing U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES 30 (1994) 
and Stephanie Riger, Gender Dilemmas in Sexual Harassment Policies and Procedures, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 
497, 498 (1991)). 
 153. Maple v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., No. 99-C6936, 2000 WL 1029112 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 154. Id. at *5. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Dise v. Henderson, No. 99-C1432, 2001 WL 11057 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
 157. Id. at *2. 
 158. Id. at *3. 
 159. Id. at *7. 
 160. ROSEMARIE SKAINE, POWER AND GENDER: ISSUES IN SEXUAL DOMINANCE AND HARASSMENT, 
65 (1996). 
 161. Ann C. Wendt & William M. Slonaker, Sexual Harassment and Retaliation: A Double-Edged 
Sword, SAM ADVANCED MGMT J., Autumn 2002, at 49.  See also Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empiri-
cal Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197 (2004) (em-
pirically analyzing the gap between the numbers of sexual harassment victims who report and who 
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Harassment victims fear this retaliation.163  Additional emotional responses 
include shock, insecurity, confusion, shame, and guilt, along with physical reac-
tions such as headaches, lethargy, panic reactions, and nightmares.164  These   re-
sponses combined with statistics that show that many women either suffer  re-
taliation or complain of it indicate that a “general fear of retaliation” may be 
more than the Ellerth/Faragher matrix allows it to be.165 
Statistics show that retaliation claims have risen recently.166  Retaliation for 
reporting sexual harassment, though, is even more prevalent.  One study         
approximates that 47 percent of women who report sexual harassment may    
experience retaliation (Figure 1).167  In another study, 70 percent of women that 
did not report their harassment claimed that fear of retaliation was a moderate 
or strong reason for their failure to come forward.168  Researchers attribute this 
 
do not, and concluding that the requirement to report may not be reasonable since so few victims do 
so). 
 162. Lawton, supra note 161, at 243 (holding that some believe that men misinterpret women’s 
actions because of socialization and experiences in life).  See Roy W. Ralston, Issues Regarding the So-
cial Psychology and Structural Consequence of Sexual Harassment, 23(2) SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AND 
PERSONALITY 105, 106-107 (1995).  Because of this misperception, men are more prone to accept har-
assing conduct as it was acceptable until the relatively recent widespread addition of women to the 
workplace.  Id. at 107.  Conversely, activities that men, because of their socialization, believe to be 
acceptable, women interpret as quite the opposite.  Id. at 109.  This socialization, which is male-
dominated, shapes women’s reactions to “put up with a lot” and continue the existing structure.  
SKAINE, supra note 160, at 77.  The addition of women into managerial positions, however, has 
changed the structure of organizations that were once dominated by men.  Id.  An allegation of sex-
ual harassment, as interpreted by men, could be used to quickly change the dynamics of the organi-
zation (i.e. attempt to change the structure and power).  Id. 
 163. See ANNE LEVY & MICHELE A. PALUDI, WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT 59 (1997); Chamal-
las supra note 83, at 375 (citing Louise F. Fitzgerald et. al., Why Didn’t She Just Report Him? The Psy-
chological and Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 117, 122 
(1995) and noting various things victims of harassment fear including “fear of retaliation, of not be-
ing believed, of hurting one’s career, or of being shamed and humiliated”). 
 164. Levy and Paludi, supra note 163. 
 165. See discussion supra Part III.B.  Courts have held that a plaintiff’s general fear of retaliation 
makes the failure to report the harassment to the employer unreasonable, therefore allowing the de-
fendant to avail itself of the affirmative defense.  See discussion supra Part III.C.; LEVY & PALUDI, su-
pra note 163, at 59.  See also Wendt & Slonaker, supra note 161, at 54.  Wendt and Slonaker report an 
increase in both evidence of retaliation and retaliation claims when women reported harassment.  Id.  
In many cases, a company, or the alleged harasser, defends itself by arguing that any adverse em-
ployment action against the harassment victim was not based on retaliation, but poor work perform-
ance.  However true it may be in some cases, this may also be caused by the harassment itself.  Some 
career effects are work habit changes, reduced performance, and withdrawal.  LEVY & PALUDI, supra 
note 163, at 59.  Therefore, it is easy to envision a cycle of harassment, decreased performance, and a 
work action that is retaliatory in nature but may be blamed on the employee’s declining work per-
formance. 
 166. Wendt & Slonaker, supra note 161, at 49. 
 167. Id. at 54 (“Retaliation claims based on sexual harassment compared with original sexual 
harassment claims occur substantially more frequently than any of the other retaliation claims com-
pared with their respective original basis.”).  See also Edward A. Marshall, Excluding Participation in 
Internal Complaint Mechanisms From Absolute Retaliation Protection: Why Everyone, Including Employers, 
Loses, 5 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 549, 586-87 (2001) (stating that between one-third and sixty 
percent of employees that report harassment experience retaliation). 
 168. Marshall, supra note 167, at 587. 
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high rate of retaliation in sexual harassment claims to the underlying basis of 
sexual harassment – power.169 
Figure 1 
Women’s Retaliation Claims by Original Bases Compared to Nonretaliation 
Claims Filed During 1985 through 1999 
 
Basis Retaliation Claims Nonretaliation Claims Percentage 
Race 158 1,114 14 
Sex-Gender 77 543 14 
Sex-Pregnancy 4 255 2 
Sex-Harassment 129 275 47 
Disability 56 453 12 
Age 43 345 12 
National Origin 7 48 15 
Religion 6 37 16 
Not Identified* 35 0 N/A 
No Basis** 0 175 N/A 
Total 515 3,245 N/A 
*Original Basis not identified 
**Claimants failed to state a prima facie case. 
Source: Wendt & Slonaker 
The relationship in employee perception cases between constructive dis-
charge and fear of retaliation becomes clearer when one considers that retalia-
tion takes many forms (Figure 2).170  One study found termination was the most 
common retaliatory mechanism and twenty-seven percent of these terminations 
were constructive discharges.171  That twenty-seven percent of retaliation cases 
stem from constructive discharge shows a fundamental connection in the two 
types of employee perception cases this paper addresses, particularly since the 
Suders decision allows employers to prevent and correct as long as the construc-
tive discharge is not accompanied by an official act.  Employee perception that 
causes the employee to leave the employment and employee perception that 
causes the employee to be afraid appear related, with equal potential to stall ap-
plication of the Ellerth/Faragher matrix. 
 
 169. Wendt & Slonaker, supra note 161, at 54.  See also discussion supra Part III.  Part III discusses 
the societal and psychological relationships of power to sexual harassment.  A contrary position 
states that retaliation is part of the employer’s right to control its employees and to prevent them 
from filing complaints with little merit.  Marshall, supra note 167, at 586-87. 
 170. Wendt & Slonaker, supra note 161, at 55. 
 171. Id.  Another common form of retaliation is economic loss, which includes demotion, reduc-
tion of wages or hours, and an exclusion from training.  Aggression, further harassment, and miscel-
laneous acts rounded out the most common forms of retaliation.  Id. 
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Figure 2 




Economic Loss 15 
Aggression 13 
Sexual Harassment 2 
Miscellaneous Actions 9 
Total 100 
Source: Wendt & Slonaker 
The EEOC provides guidance on employees’ fear in sexual harassment 
cases.172  The EEOC states that retaliation should be construed broadly and is not 
required to affect the “terms or conditions of employment.”173  The manual dis-
courages any activity that may negatively affect the conditions of employment, 
whether material or not, that will deter an employee from taking the protected 
action of reporting harassment and receiving a remedy.174  “An interpretation of 
Title VII that permits some forms of retaliation to go unpunished would both 
undermine the effectiveness of the EEO statutes and conflict with the language 
of the anti-retaliation provisions.”175 
The majority of courts, nonetheless, hold that failure to report sexual har-
assment due to a general fear of retaliation is not reasonable.176  These holdings 
exist despite the statistical evidence that employees fear retaliation and that their 
fear is justified, making a simple solution in employee perception cases diffi-
cult.177  The Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense exists to alleviate employer strict 
liability.  In the absence of an adverse tangible employment action, including 
constructive discharge cases unaccompanied by an official act, the employee 
must report the harassment to give the employer the opportunity to correct and 
to remediate the problem.  If the employer does not have that opportunity       
because the employee fears retaliation, then the employer will essentially suffer 
strict liability for any harassment because apparently almost all employees fear 
retaliation. 
 
 172. EEOC, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, Directives Transmittal No. 915.003, Retaliation (May 
20, 1998), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.pdf [hereinafter EEOC COMPLIANCE 
MANUAL]. 
 173. Id. § 8-II.D.3. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See Iduyusi v. Tenn. Dep’t. Children’s Serv., 30 Fed. Appx. 398, 403-4 (6th Cir. 2002); Wyatt 
v. Hunt Plywood Co., Inc., 297 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2002); Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 
F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2001); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014 (10th Cir. 2001); Leopold v. 
Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 2001); Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 1999); 
Mangrum v. Republic Indus., Inc., 260 F.Supp.2d 1229 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Murray v. City of Winston 
Salem, 203 F. Supp. 2d 493, 501 (M.D.N.C. 2002); Willingham v. QMS, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20423 (S.D. Ala. 1999). 
 177. See Wendt & Slonaker, supra note 161, at 55. 
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Is there is a way to balance the employer’s opportunity to remedy harass-
ment and the employee’s right to experience and react to their fear?  Courts have 
two options to handle this quandary.  The first option is an objective test—since 
every harassed employee will fear retaliation, each employee must come for-
ward to report.  The second option also assumes that every employee will fear 
retaliation and therefore requires every employer to establish procedures that 
ensure an employee can report without fear of retaliation.  However, there are 
problems with each option. 
The employee must report the harassment and take advantage of an em-
ployer’s remedial scheme to negate the employer’s affirmative defense.  This   
option is very employer-friendly as it places the burden on the employee to 
overcome his or her fear and report.  With this option, courts could never find 
that a failure to report was reasonable due to fear of retaliation, even though the 
fear was subjectively unavoidable. 
On the other hand, in an employee-friendly option, the employer would 
have to take additional steps to create a system where the employee could report 
with no fear of retaliation.  Placing this burden on an employer would support 
the existence and adequacy of a remedial scheme.178  Such steps could include an 
“800 number” or reporting service with no connection to the employer’s man-
agement structure, or neutral, non-supervisory members of the Human           
Resources staff so that there are several people within the company to whom the 
employee could report.179  Another alternative is to outsource the mechanism by 
which employees may report sexual harassment claims and to hire a third party 
to investigate those claims.180  This option may be favorable to small businesses 
with no Human Resources department because it will maintain the confidential-
ity of the complaints in a neutral manner.181  The service allows employees to 
dial an 800 number which prompts them to enter responses about their com-
plaint through an automated system.182  The employee then receives a follow-up 
call within eight hours from a manager with the company to which the service 
was outsourced, and the employer also receives a call within 12 hours.183         Al-
 
 178. Although this would place the burden on the employer, it may not be sufficiently different 
from the current scheme.  The defendant has the burden to prove that the employee’s failure to re-
port was unreasonable.  “A credible fear must be based on more than the employee’s subjective be-
lief.  Evidence must be produced to the effect that the employer has ignored or resisted similar com-
plaints or has taken adverse actions against employees in response to such complaints.”  Leopold v. 
Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 179. See John J. Fons, The Case for Compliance: Now it’s a Necessity, Not an Option, 13 BUS. LAW 
TODAY 27, 31 (2003). 
 180. See Jonathan Day, The Problem of Perceptions: Reasons for Outsourcing the Sexual Harassment 
Investigation, 27 EMP. RELATIONS TODAY, Spring 2000, at 101-07.  This option may be favorable to 
small businesses with no Human Resources department because it will maintain the confidentiality 
of the complaints in a neutral and relatively cost-effective manner.  An example of a third party 
reporting service is T.R. Anton, a company based out of California.  See Jeremy Quittner, The Latest in 
Outsourcing: A Harassment Hotline, BUS. WK. ONLINE, at http://www.businessweek.com/ 
smallbiz/news/date/9809/e980916.htm (Sept. 16, 1998). 
 181. See Day, supra note 180, at 101-07. 
 182. See Quittner, supra note 180. 
 183. Id. 
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though an automated system may seem impersonal, the service is relatively cost 
effective.184 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Employer behavior is the guide in most cases for determining liability un-
der the Ellerth/Faragher matrix.  Employer behavior, however, does not drive the 
determination in two related claims that, rather, rely upon employee percep-
tion—constructive discharge and fear of retaliation.  Both employee perception 
claims derive from the employee’s view and are further related by evidence that 
one of the main types of retaliation employees experience is constructive dis-
charge.185 
Fear of retaliation and constructive discharge further overlap when one 
considers that each must typically be accompanied by something objective in 
order to be actionable.  Under Suders, constructive discharge must be accompa-
nied by an official act while many courts require fear of retaliation claims be ac-
companied by some type of overt act—a conflicted combination of increased 
dependence on both subjective employee perception and objective analysis of 
employer behavior.  Without the official act or corroboration, employees face 
coming forward despite both the fear of retaliation and the certain psychological 
impact that comes with the sexual harassment.  The pervasiveness of fear of re-
taliation for reporting sexual harassment alone renders employee response and 
unwillingness to come forward a near-certainty.  In such an atmosphere, a 
court’s requirement for a harassed employee to report over that fear is an objec-
tive line in the sand that does not square with the subjective reaction of the em-
ployee, hence a “stall” in the Ellerth/Faragher matrix. 
The matrix, however, serves the valuable function of providing efficiency 
and predictability in the resolution of sexual harassment claims in an effort to 
protect employees who have less power in such situations.  It is, accordingly, 
highly ironic that the very claims that derive from employee perception are the 
ones that stall the matrix and lead to inconsistent outcomes across courts and 
circuits.  Therefore, a standard that consistently considers employee perception 
in the context of employer behavior, but is not dependent on employer behavior, 
is imperative if the matrix is to serve its intended function. 
Such a standard is a challenge.  For example, if every employee who feared 
retaliation could avoid reporting the harassment, there would be no conflict and 
the matrix would not stall—but given that virtually all employees fear retalia-
tion, no one would be obligated to come forward.  Similarly, if all employees 
who felt uncomfortable at work when suffering harassment could claim con-
structive discharge without something further to show that their suffering was 
significant, every employee would claim constructive discharge and every     
employer would experience strict liability.  Neither option improves the effi-
ciency of the matrix. 
 
 184. See id.  The president of Anton estimates that the company successfully serviced over 100 
companies, totaling over 20,000 employees, within its first two years of existence.  Id. 
 185. See Wendt & Slonaker, supra note 161, at 55. 
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On the other hand, the current split in the circuits certainly undermines the 
matrix as well.  The Suders Court’s requirement of an “official act” in construc-
tive discharge claims essentially requires the pre-existence of a tangible adverse 
employment action before finding strict liability.  If there is already an official 
act, there is no longer any need to question the constructive discharge.  Con-
structive discharge becomes meaningless as a determining factor in finding strict 
liability under prong one of the matrix.186 
A more reasonable approach lies with the EEOC, which mandates that con-
structive discharge exists when the employer “imposes intolerable working con-
ditions in violation of Title VII when those conditions foreseeably would compel 
a reasonable employee to quit, whether or not the employer specifically in-
tended to force the victim’s resignation.”187  This mandate is relatively similar to 
the “breaking point” determination imposed by the Suders Court.  If the court 
stopped with the “breaking point” requirement, and did not impose the “official 
act” requirement, the matrix would be hampered to some degree by the factual 
determination, but a balance would exist.  Employees could prove constructive 
discharge in a manner creating strict liability under prong one of the matrix 
without a pre-existing official act.  This approach respects the employee’s per-
ception of the level of harassment in the workplace without making the          
employer’s behavior irrelevant.188 
With regard to fear of retaliation, courts should strive for a similar balance.  
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is in place to shield those who seek the stat-
ute’s protection.189  If those who fear wrongful behavior still must come forward, 
that protection is arguably lost.  If, however, everyone fears that wrongful       
behavior, then no one would come forward.  Without required employee report-
ing, the remedial components of the affirmative defense that create incentives 
for employers to prevent and correct might be diminished.  If courts required a 
similar standard for fear of retaliation as we suggest for constructive dis-
charge—that an employee who reasonably fears retaliation receives either pro-
tection from coming forward or some guarantee against the retaliation as with 
anonymous reporting—then as with constructive discharge claims, both the 
 
 186. See Albert J. Solecki Jr. & Lori A. Mazur, Does Constructive Discharge Bar an Employers’ 
Defense?, EMP. L. STRATEGIST, (Feb. 2004), at http://www.goodwinprocter.com/publications/ 
solecki_mazur_02_04.pdf (describing why Suders holding regarding constructive discharge 
essentially forces an issue of fact.) 
 187. EEOC, POLICY GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT, No. N-915-050 (Mar. 
19, 1990), at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/currentissues.html (citing Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 
796 F.2d 340, 343-44, 41 (10th Cir. 1986); Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3rd Cir. 
1984); Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 812-15 (9th Cir. 1982); Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 
(6th Cir. 1982); Clark v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 1168, 1175 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. 
Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
 188. See Chamallas, supra note 83, at 390-91 (analyzing a range of responses to constructive dis-
charge cases including an employer-friendly approach, an employee-friendly approach and a third 
balanced approach based on causation). 
 189. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 704(a), 78 Stat. 241, 257 (1964); Rosalie Ber-
ger Levinson, Parsing the Meaning of “Adverse Employment Action” in Title VII Disparate Treatment, 
Sexual Harassment, and Retaliation Claims: What Should be Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 
623, 635 (2003). 
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employee’s perception and the employer’s behavior impact the outcome 
equally.  With balance there is efficiency and the matrix can function. 
